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1 The book reviewed here, Roberto Frega’s Practice, Judgment, and the Challenge of Moral
and Political Disagreement, is an important and ambitious book. It is ambitious because it
addresses the problems at stake in contemporary philosophical debates without any
kind of  awkwardness  and shyness.  Frega  believes  pragmatism to  be  a  theoretically
viable  option,  and  tries  to  prove  its  soundness  by  adopting  it  as  the  conceptual
framework  of  a  theory  of  moral  objectivity  alternative  to  the  ones  formulated  by
analytic  philosophers  (e.g.,  Rawls),  defenders  of  communicative  reason (Habermas),
and critical theorists. It is important precisely because it suggests a new account of
objectivity able to overcome the pitfalls that plagued previous attempts to explain the
validity of  moral  and political  judgments.  Moreover,  it  is  also important because it
provides an analysis of the notion of moral objectivity that highlights the main features
of originality of the pragmatist tradition, and, in doing so, supplies us with a set of
criteria through which it is possible to distinguish among the various lines of thought
that coexist in that tradition. 
2 The last point is particularly relevant, and it is not by chance that the book begins with
a discussion of the similarities and differences between Peirce and Dewey. Pragmatism
is becoming a respected voice on moral and political issues, but different interpreters
have chosen different aspects of the theory as worthy of being preserved. Different
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images of pragmatism have therefore arisen, and Deweyan and Peircean conceptions of
justification,  objectivity,  pluralism,  and so on,  have been compared and contrasted.
Peirce has been read as advocating a realistic view of objectivity. Objectivity should be
defined in terms of truth: there is one way in which things are, and a judgment is true if
and only if  it  adequately represents the way in which things are.  On the contrary,
Dewey’s philosophy has been read as an attempt to get rid of these strong forms of
realism  in  favor  of  a  contextual  account  of  objectivity.  According  to  this  view,
objectivity depends on the particular point of view from which reality is described. 
3 Contrary  to  interpreters  such  as  Talisse  and  Misak,  who  have  emphasized  the
differences between Peirce and Dewey, Frega’s approach is much more irenic. While
endorsing a theory of objectivity that is largely indebted to Dewey and highly critical of
Peirce’s scientism, Frega does not introduce any sharp distinction or break between the
two versions of  pragmatism.  Certainly,  he recognizes  that  many aspects  of  Peirce’s
theory of rationality are not useful for developing a satisfactory account of the logical
processes through which moral and political problems are solved. The Fixation of Belief –
or, at least, a certain reading of it – shows that, according to Peirce’s epistemology,
practical problems cannot be solved by using rational methods of inquiry. It is true that
Peirce believes science to be the best method for fixing beliefs, but he also maintains
that recourse to science does not hold when we are confronted with practical affairs
because, in all these cases, we do not want to know primarily how things are, but how
we should act. So, if science is the search for general laws governing reality, and if the
discovery of such laws depends on the possibility of bracketing individual preferences,
science cannot be of any use to an agent when he is engaged in practical reasoning.
4 However, Frega argues for the validity of Peirce’s general account of rationality. From
his point of view, Dewey’s logic of inquiry completes Peirce’s analysis of the structure
of reason because it shows how to transform “Peirce’s naturalistic insight into a full-
fledged naturalistic account of thinking and knowledge” (12). This naturalistic insight
is the idea that rationality is a process of belief fixation that has evolved through time,
thus selecting the methods and concepts that have proven themselves to be reliable
rules of action. Their reliability as rules of action depends on their responsiveness to
experience and to arguments: valid beliefs are those that are not contradicted by facts
to  which  the  other  agents  have  access  and  agree  with  the  beliefs  held  by  other
participants to the activity (or practice).  Reason is therefore conceived as a natural
property that characterizes the way in which complex biological organisms experience
the  world  and  handle  problematic  situations.  Broadly  speaking,  it  consists  in  the
capacity  of  an  agent  to  adopt  a  self-reflective  stance  towards  his  actions,  and  to
evaluate the correctness of a certain course of action in terms of its consequences. 
5 Frega moves from this point to elaborate his pragmatist account of moral objectivity.
Its basic assumption is that everything that has logical validity is not a given but a
construct. The two notions which Frega relies on in order to articulate his views on the
nature of rationality are the concept of judgment and the idea of normative practice.
“Normative  practice”  is  the  term  chosen  by  Frega  to  name  the  “critical  and
justificatory  activities  through  which  agents  defend  or  criticize  given  behaviors,
opinions, or institutions” (22). It is a concept that does not belong to the pragmatist
tradition, but which happily expresses an insight that pragmatists had the merit of
formulating with clarity and consistency. This is the idea that normativity cannot be
boiled down to an act of following a given rule. If one calls to mind Peirce’s distinction
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between the first and the third degree of clearness of a general concept formulated in
How to Make Our Ideas Clear, it is easy to understand what Frega means to say. There is a
distinction  to  be  drawn  between  habit  as  a  mechanical  repetition  of  acts  and  a
purposeful  course  of  action  which  is  habitual  because  it  represents  a  general
disposition  that  is  essentially  self-corrective.  Human  activities  –  Frega’s  normative
practices  –  are  truly  human  only  insofar  as  they  are  meaningful,  and  their  being
meaningful depends upon the reflective analysis of the consequences that follow from a
certain action. 
6 On the contrary,  judgment is  a  technical  term in pragmatist  vocabulary.  As  is  well
known, in his Logic Dewey defines judgment as “the settled outcome of inquiry”, and
distinguishes  judgment from propositions  on the basis  of  their  different  existential
import  (LW 12:  123).  While  propositions  are  tentative  solutions  of  a  problematic
situation, judgment is the result of a process through which doubt is settled and new
beliefs are established. Frega accepts the theoretical framework provided by Dewey in
his Logic, and uses some of the latter’s insights to sketch a theory of reasoning powerful
enough and broad enough to account not only for scientific research but also for moral
and political inquiries. 
7 One of  Frega’s  most  important  achievements  in the book is  the clarification of  the
structure of judgment (in general) and of moral judgment (in particular). As Dewey has
shown, judgment is composed of two ‘moments’: an articulative and a transformative
phase.  Articulation  and  transformation  are  therefore  the  two  operations  thanks  to
which the reconstruction of a problematic situation can be brought about. Through
articulation the problem that originates reflection is defined as a problem. Frega is very
careful to remark that articulation should not be confused with analysis: contrary to
the latter, indeed, articulation does not assume its objects as something which is at the
disposal of the agent from the very beginning of the inquiry. The objects that an agent
employs in his search for the solution of a certain problem are the outcome of a process
of articulative inquiry. Central for the understanding of the peculiarity of this process
is the notion of situation. Situation should be taken here in strict Deweyan sense as the
“complex existence that is held together in spite of its internal complexity by the fact
that  it  is  dominated and characterized throughout  by a  single  quality”  (LW 5:  246;
quoted  at  page  53).  Following  Dewey,  Frega  argues  that  the  unarticulated  whole
characterized by a single, unique quality is what can be properly called ‘the given.’
However, it is a given not in the sense of being an epistemologically simple entity, but
rather in the sense of being the ultimate and untranscendable horizon of every possible
logical  activity.  A  situation  is  articulated  in  thought  when  objects  that  satisfy  the
requirements of inquiry are constructed and, in doing so, pave the way for the solution
of the problem.
8 Once the situation is constructed as problematic and further articulated in the inquiry,
an agent can elaborate a plan of action whose raison d’être is to enable him to transform
reality  according  to  the  goals  that  he  has  assumed  as  his  own.  Transformation  is
therefore  a  logical  notion,  whose  most  adequate  exemplification  is  the  modern
experimental conception of knowledge. Inquiry transforms the existential conditions
that gave birth to reflection as  well  as  the system of  beliefs  of  the agent.  The two
aspects are closely related: if the hypothetical course of action identified in reflection
proves itself to be successful, then “thus-far hypothetical belief is stabilized and a new
pattern of habits emerges” (56). The notion of transformation crosses the boundaries
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between public and private, objective and subjective, thus revealing the anti-Cartesian
attitude of pragmatist epistemology.
9 This is almost commonsensical knowledge for any pragmatist scholar. Frega has the
merit  to  provide  evidence  that  it  is  possible  to  build  on these  tenets  to  develop a
consistent theory of moral reasoning. Two are the most interesting issues in moral and
political philosophy that he takes into account. The first one concerns the definition of
the notion of public. Public is a momentum concept for moral and political philosophy
because it represents the fact of intersubjectivity. The traditional distinction between
public and private relies on the possibility of distinguishing what is done in order to
satisfy private, personal desires and what is pursued on behalf of the interest of the
community. For a reasoning to be public an agent has to take the point of view of the
other members of the community, and, consequently, has to sacrifice what could give
him personal gratification. Frega shows with great clearness and force that such an
alternative  is  not  necessary.  The  unquestioned  assumption  at  the  basis  of  all  the
approaches that acknowledge the validity of the dichotomy between public and private
is the idea that both the public and the private are well-formed entities even before
entering in relationship, and that they are governed by different and incommensurable
‘logics’. Now, if this were true, an individual could not completely realize himself in his
community: his realization would always be partial because the adoption of the point of
view of the community follows from the renunciation – Frega speaks of “purification”
(108) – of some of his desires and pretensions. This would entail a break in the unity of
experience,  whose  epistemological  consequences  are  the  split  of  rationality  into  a
private  and  a  public  dimension  and,  consequently,  the  destruction  of  the  unity  of
reason. 
10 The insistence on the constructive power of judgment enables Frega to overcome all
these difficulties. According to his convincing diagnosis, Habermas and Rawls – and the
traditions that stem from them – have failed to give an adequate account of public
reasoning because they have not realized that the community to which an individual
refers is not something which has to be accepted and justified, but something which
has to be constructed and transformed. The public has often been conceived as a set of
beliefs that the private agent has to subscribe or reject. Now, such an intellectualistic
approach  to  the  issue  of  the  relationship  between  the  public  and  the  private  has
generated an unfortunate misunderstanding of the nature of the public. Indeed, it has
prevented many from seeing that disagreement – disagreement between an individual
and his community as well as between two (or more) individuals belonging to the same
community – should not be treated as a logical contradiction that can be overcome if
and only if at least one of the competing points of view is shown to rely on false beliefs.
In reality, disagreement is a fact of human experience, a fact that is becoming more and
more  dominant  and  inclusive  as  a  consequence  of  the  increasing  complexity  of
modernity. The challenge of modern life is to shape conceptual tools for handling the
conflicts originated by different and competing ideals and ways of life, not to elaborate
conceptual strategies aiming at questioning the legitimacy of a plurality of opinions,
beliefs and points of view.
11 It is in this sense that Frega states that the aim of moral and political reflection is not
justificatory but transformative: “constitution through inquiry, and not representation
through justification, defines the proper core of public reason” (97). Far from being a
static entity that has to be taken into account in inquiry, the public is the “outcome of
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the reflective process of inquiry aimed at the identification of the consequences” (102).
The point that Frega wants to emphasize is that the notion of the public should be
defined in functional terms. The idea of the public arises when an action is conceived as
producing consequences that are neither natural effects nor epistemic implications but
consequences  having  a  social  impact.  More  clearly  stated,  “[t]he  concept  of  public
refers only to those consequences (intended or unintended) that affect people beyond
those directly involved in the action” (101). So, a particular public is brought into being
when agents engaged in a common enterprise realize that the consequences of their
actions have relevant effects on other people. 
12 The functional definition of the public shows the theoretical fertility of the pragmatist
conception of rationality of inquiry. Indeed, the latter provides a general framework in
which it is possible to formulate the problems of moral and political philosophy in a
way that makes it easier to find their solution. Moral and political issues, on the one
hand, and the public – conceived as that community of people who share an interest in
the consequences of  a  certain group of  actions –,  on the other  hand,  are  mutually
determined and constructed in the process of inquiry through which a problematic
situation is  solved.  The public,  the  issues  to  be  dealt  with in  a  political  and moral
inquiry,  the  interests  and  aims  of  the  agents  engaged  in  a  public  activity  acquire
significance only as a consequence of a process of construction of their meaning – a
process that consists  in discovering the possible  consequences of  an action.  For this
reason, I am not completely persuaded of what Frega says about the public being “the
outcome  of  a  political  quest” (104).  I  fully  agree  with  Frega  that  the  passage  to  a
transformative conception of public reasoning grounded on a issue-centered approach
to politics determines a dynamic conception of the public. However, since the public
originates  from  a  problematic  situation,  according  to  a  pragmatist  epistemology  it
should disappear when the problem is solved. As is evident, if this is correct the public
cannot be the outcome of a political and moral inquiry, but should be treated as an
extremely  refined  tool  that  is  constructed  and  used  in  inquiry  but  has  no  logical
validity outside of it. Here Frega seems to relapse into a structural and anti-pragmatist
way of intending the concept of the public, which relies on a misunderstanding of the
logical nature of the conceptual instruments employed in reasoning.
13 Leaving aside the last critical observation, it is important to note that Frega’s notion of
the public is extremely interesting for another order of reasons. As has been remarked
above, it  follows directly from the rejection of the classical distinction between the
public and the private that the former should not be treated as the result of a process of
purification of personal interests, but rather as the ‘locus’ where agents can find their
most complete realization. It is very likely that some sort of Hegelian suggestion about
the relation between the particular and the universal is at work here. In any case, the
point that deserves attention is not historical but theoretical: it has to do with the idea
that an internal relationship links together the public and public reasoning. The polemic
target that Frega has in mind here is the way critical theorists conceive the structure of
the public. According to them, the public is a field of conflicting forces in which there is
no other rule than power: the dominating position is not the one that is (more) correct
or  (more)  fair,  but  the  one  which  better  represents  the  interests  of  the  majority.
According to this view, therefore, it does not make any sense to search for a logic of
public reasoning because reasoning is at best a way of concealing the real nature of the
public, that is, the instable equilibrium of conflicting interests. 
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14 As Frega explicitly acknowledges, the solution he advocates is a third way outside the
dichotomy between accepting the classical distinction of “public” and “private” ways of
conducting an inquiry and denying logical validity to public reasoning (115). Following
Dewey, Frega wants to stress the fact that the public represents a possible way in which
agents tackle the problems that are caused by their actions, and in doing so they can
find a possible realization of their interests and desires. In order to achieve this goal he
relies on the notion of ‘expression’ or ‘expressive inquiry.’ This is the second important
contribution that Frega gives to the theory of moral reasoning.
15 Expressive inquiry is the idea that moral reasoning has a strong articulative power, and
that the process of articulation consists of a process of expression of the self. As has
been said above, every inquiry has an articulative moment: this is the phase in which a
situation is constructed as a problematic situation. In the case of moral inquiry, what
has to be articulated is not only the external situation but also the net of beliefs that
define  the  character  of  the  moral  agent.  Therefore,  moral  judgment  is  more
complicated  than  scientific  judgment  because  the  former  cannot  be  concerned
exclusively with the articulation of external conditions. Moral action is an action in
which what is at stake is the kind of person that the agent wants to be. Consequently,
moral  judgment  has  to  be expressive  of  the  self,  both  in  the  sense  of  taking  into
account the beliefs of the agent about what is right to do and to be and in the sense of
being the factor that helps the self develop and express its potentialities. It is for this
reason that  Frega says  that  moral  inquiry  encompasses  “a  broad array  of  thinking
activity”: not only the reflection on the possible consequences of an action, but also
self-analysis,  the comparison of  the situation with the agent’s  desires,  criteria,  and
expectations, the making of hypotheses about the way to become the kind of person
that one wants to be (80).
16 It should be evident now that Frega’s expressivism has nothing to do with the versions
of expressivism elaborated by analytic philosophers. Indeed, far from supporting a non-
cognitivist interpretation of morality, Frega’s expressivism denotes a particular quality
of moral reasoning and, consequently, of moral rationality. At the same time, however,
the insistence on the concept of expression makes it possible for Frega to avoid the
strong cognitivist implications of the thesis that inquiry is the best method that an
agent has to fix his beliefs. Again, Frega’s aim is to find a via media between two equally
unsatisfactory alternatives. 
17 This  point  stands  out  clearly  if  one  takes  into  consideration  Frega’s  discussion  of
relativism.  According  to  Frega,  relativism  should  not  be  considered  as  a  problem
haunting moral reflection but as a fact constitutive of human experience (132). It is a
fact  that  there  is  a  plurality  of  perspectives  since  it  is  a  fact  that  human  beings
interpret  reality  in  different  ways  according to  their  interests,  desires,  and beliefs.
Consequently,  to  criticize  relativism  at  this  level  is  nonsensical  because  it would
amount to denying an essential aspect of (moral) reality. Relativism can be criticized
only as a philosophical theory that challenges not the fact of disagreement, but the
very possibility of moral agreement. 
18 This assumption has important bearings on the evaluation of theoretical tenability of
relativism. First of all, as a consequence of the shift of attention from relativism as a
problem to relativism as a fact of experience Frega can formulate the issue at stake in
the  debate  between  relativists  and  realists  in  a  radically  new way.  The  traditional
conception  of  relativism  is  grounded  in  two  independent  theses:  “the  claim  that
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different views on any given issue may be incompatible and yet coexist” and the thesis
that  that claim  entails  “the  impossibility  to  attain  context-independent  normative
standards” (137). According to this view, the fact of relativism (de facto level) implies a
distrust in the possibility of achieving an agreement founded on rational norms (de jure
level).  This  kind of  relativism – which Frega labels  as  ‘dogmatic’  –  brings about an
equally  dogmatic  form  of  realism  which  assumes  that  both  de  facto and  de  jure
relativisms are false. Dogmatic anti-relativism is an account of moral objectivity which
holds  a)  that  it  is  always  possible  to  “reach  an  uncontroversial  solution  within  a
reasonable (not indefinite) time” if the inquiry is not distorted by personal interests;
and  b)  that  “[t]he  outcome  of  any  well-conducted  inquiry  is  independent  of  the
inquiring agents’ epistemic conditions” (138).
19 Frega  convincingly  argues  that  a  relativist  is  not  forced  to  accept  both  the  theses
mentioned above. If he holds the first – the idea that pluralism is not contradictory –
and drops the second – the idea that the fact  of  pluralism does not support  moral
objectivity  –  he  can  endorse  a  kind  of  relativism  which  is  epistemologically  less
vulnerable  to  anti-relativist  criticisms.  It  is  less  vulnerable  not  because it  concedes
something that an anti-relativist account of objectivity cannot deny – the possibility of
objectivity –,  but  because it  dramatically  alters  the epistemological  framework that
makes the very contraposition between relativism and anti-relativism possible. 
20 This is the ultimate meaning of the expressivist turn that Frega gives to the theory of
moral  reasoning.  Moral  inquiry  should  not  be  conceived  as  the  search  for  a
representation  of  what  is  morally  true,  but  rather  as  the  search  for  a  satisfactory
compromise among the different interests,  desires,  and beliefs of the members of a
community. Stated in Kantian terms, it can be said that, according to Frega, the notion
of truth is not the principle of moral judgments. Frega’s contention is that if one tries
to understand moral inquiry as a type of reasoning relying on the principle of non-
contradiction and aiming at achieving a form of objectivity similar to the one achieved
in science he is easily led to misconceive the role that moral reflection plays in our life.
What we want from moral objectivity is a method for fixing beliefs: “objectivity,” Frega
writes,  “names the capacity of  these regulations [habits]  to  successfully  respond to
challenges” (158). The objectivity that is the goal of moral reasoning is the construction
of a new way of life that can be judged fair and correct by all its participants since it is
the  expression  and  articulation  of  their  points  of  views.  It  is  for  this  reason  that
disagreement is so important for Frega: it is the fact that the plurality of perspectives
on what is good cannot be overcome on an epistemological level – that is,  it  is not
possible to ascertain the true opinion on the conduct of life because all the different
perspectives represent legitimate ways of conceiving moral reality – that grounds the
validity  of  moral  constructivism.  In other  words,  truth  cannot  be  the  key  to
understanding morality because in moral inquiry agents “do not aim first at ‘getting
things right’ but rather at ‘getting things done’” (162).
21 The  last  remark  brings  us  to  the  core  of  Frega’s  constructivism.  Keeping  in  mind
Dewey’s definition of object as what is “produced and ordered in settled form by means
of inquiry,” it is not difficult to see how Frega can defuse the problems that motivate
the traditional rejection of relativism (LW 12: 122). Constructivism means that human
beings have to find a method to solve the difficulties that arise from social, political,
economical  inequalities,  and  that  the  validity  of  the  solution  they  produced  is
warranted by its effectiveness in constructing a satisfactory way of life. Consequently,
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even without embracing a cognitivist conception of objectivity, Frega’s constructivism
is not exposed to the risk of relativism because a morally objective belief is the one that
shows in practice what is its meaning and what is its epistemic value. 
22 It is for this reason that Frega puts such a great emphasis on the notion of practice, in
general,  and  of  normative  practice,  in  particular.  The  latter  is  the  cornerstone  of
Frega’s expressivism since it is the theoretical device that enables him to account for
moral  objectivity  in  pragmatic  terms.  However,  there is  a  price  to  be paid for  this
choice. Indeed, the primacy of practice over theory implies a dramatic restriction of the
creativity of reason which, in turn, implies a restriction of the transformative power of
inquiry. Frega accepts this conclusion. He speaks of an “inescapability of the context of
practice” to refer to the fact that every tool constructed in inquiry – no matter how
refined and sophisticated it could be – has to be brought back to the particular context
from which it  arises and to be used to solve the problem that has called up moral
reflection (139). More clearly stated, the point that Frega wants to emphasize is that
normative practices set limits to the acts of reasoning that take those very normative
practices as their subject-matter. 
23 However strange it may seem, this description catches an important element of moral
inquiry. As is well known, one of the most important traits of moral reasoning is the
search for moral justifications. To use Frega’s own words, justification is “the activity
through which an agent proffers arguments intended to show belief, decision, or action
to be legitimate” (179). Now, an agent undertakes a justificatory activity when some of
his moral and political beliefs are put into question by another person. This statement
is not as trivial as it may seem at a first glance. Traditionally, the search for moral
justification has been conceived as  an armchair  activity made by philosophers,  “an
intellectual  undertaking  whose  relevance  does  not  depend  on  its  effectiveness  in
answering real doubts such as they emerge in social life” (179). According to this view,
an inquirer  searches  for  a  justification of,  say,  democracy because he  has  a  purely
intellectual interest in it.  Against this intellectualistic account of justification, Frega
calls the attention to the nature of the disagreement that has to be resolved by moral
judgment: “the source of disagreement,” he writes, “must be living” (179). This does
not mean simply that the agents have a practical interest in solving that problem. It
means, first and foremost, that they cannot escape from the particular conditions in
which they are immersed.
24 It  is  important  to  understand  the  epistemic  consequences  of  this  strong  form  of
contextualism.  The epistemological  primacy of  existing  normative  practices  implies
that the argumentative strategies that  are available to be used to reach agreement
among the members of  a  community are limited to their  actual  ‘knowledge’.  “Each
practice,”  Frega  observes,  “is  spatio-temporally  determined,  in  order  to  limit  its
reference to the conditions that define the possibilities of inquiry in a given place and
time” (172). It follows therefore that if the critics of a certain normative practice – for
instance, our democratic way of living and handling conflicts – are not disposed to
accept the entire framework of that form of life, it is not possible for its members to
provide a justification of its legitimacy. There is an important distinction that has to be
drawn,  Frega  warns  us,  between  internal  and  external  justification.  External
justification is a type of justification that holds universally for all rational persons. This
kind of  justification – whose possibility is  at  the basis  of  the successes of  scientific
inquiry – cannot be achieved in moral reasoning because in this case it is impossible to
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‘bracket’  the differences among individuals.  The differences of  beliefs,  of  values,  of
interests,  of  desires  are  the  source  of  disagreement,  and  to  say that  to  overcome
disagreement  one  should  not  pay  attention  to  them  is  like  saying  that  moral
disagreement is not worthy of attention. Consequently, the only justification that can
be provided for the legitimacy of a normative practice is internal. More clearly stated,
since  moral  inquiry  is  the  construction  of  a  new  normative  practice  in  which  the
members of a community can find a satisfactory expression of their perspectives on
what  is  morally  relevant,  the  different  points  of  view  must  not  be  irreconcilable.
Indeed, justifications can be effective if and only if the individuals who challenge the
legitimacy of a certain normative practice share a common framework. Frega is clear
on this point: “it is very unlikely that someone who has exited democratic practice (or
has never taken part in it) will come back into it (or will join it) on the basis of an
argument demonstrating that people should be democratic so that their beliefs may be
more justified.” And he adds: “[w]ith the Schmittian there is no common ground, no
shared practice on which to build a common framework” (185). Incidentally said, the
idea that moral justification must be internal is just another way of formulating the
fundamental  pragmatist  insight  that  doubt  cannot  be  universal:  if  one  doubts  of
everything the conclusion that has to be drawn is not that nothing is certain, but that
his is not a real doubt. The problematic situation must have in itself the possibility of
its solution.
25 In conclusion, the point of Frega’s argument is that justification is a practice which is
effective only within the boundaries of a particular community of members sharing
common ideas and opinions. Disagreement on a specific moral issue is possible only
because  there  is  a  more  substantial  agreement  on  the  essential  structure  of  moral
reality. Such a more substantial agreement that makes disagreement possible is the
result  of  common  experiences,  of  common  interests,  of  common  problems  and,  in
particular, of a common education. It is rather surprising that Frega does not use the
language and the basic ideas of virtue epistemology and virtue ethics – in particular,
the concepts of habit and virtue. I believe that if Frega had addressed the issue of the
relationship between reason and will, his defense of constructivism and contextualism
would have been much clearer and sounder. In the last analysis, indeed, the truth of
Frega’s  contextualism  of  normative  practices  is  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that
normative practices do not depend on reason for their legitimation. However, this lack
of conceptual resources does not affect the soundness of the conclusions that Frega
draws from the idea of a primacy of practice over theory. Frega convincingly argues
that normative practices have legitimation not because it is always possible to provide
an universal justification of their validity, but because of the practical consequences
they engender (184). The legitimacy of democracy relies on the fact that it is a “solution
that has evolved over time, overcoming the social and political challenges that Western
society have faced over several centuries,” a solution that continues to work well in a
society that is growing more and more complicated and conflictual (213). 
26 This is the root of Frega’s pragmatist and anti-intellectualist philosophy. Consequently,
the rigorous exposition and clarification of its fundamental concepts and principles is
the  most  important  achievement  of  the  book.  Now,  to  be  clear,  I  believe  that  it  is
impossible to overestimate the importance of this approach to philosophical questions
for the future of pragmatism. Frega’s constructivist theory of rationality leads to an
empiricization of philosophical reflection that goes hand in hand with a substantial
redefinition of the language of philosophy. According to this view, philosophers should
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start  conceiving their  professional  activity  as  a  contribution to  the amelioration of
existing normative practices, and not as a purely intellectual effort devoted to find an
unshakable basis for our beliefs. These are conclusions that Frega is certainly willing to
endorse since he is  deeply committed to  fostering the mutual  interchange of  ideas
between philosophy and social sciences. But these are conclusions that every scholar
interested in pragmatism should be, if not willing to endorse, at least willing to pay due
attention to because they represent the most ambitious attempt to give a definition of
theoretical concepts in terms of their practical effects. 
27 However,  I  think  it  is  important  to  warn  against  a  possible  misunderstanding  –  a
misunderstanding from which Frega’s work, too,  seems sometimes to suffer.  As has
been remarked above,  to  insist  on the primacy of  practice  over theory is  certainly
correct, but it should not lead to deny the autonomy of theory from practice. Theory
can be defined operationally as that ensemble of normative practices whose function is
to  construct  tools  that  help  agents  to  be  more  effective  in  handling  problems
encountered in life. Now, history of technology has shown that the success of these
practices depends on the possibility of reaching higher and higher levels of abstraction.
Tools  created to handle a  practical  problem become the subject-matter of  a  higher
science. Consequently,  new  and  more  refined  tools  are  constructed  that  enable
scientists to tackle those problems that affect the application of the “original” tools to
the  specific  situations  they  were  intended  to  handle.  This  is  a  platitude,  but  this
platitude  entails  an  important  corollary.  Indeed,  it  follows  from  it  that  in  some
particular  cases  it  may  be  useful  to  adopt  an  extremely  general  attitude  toward
morality.  In  some  cases,  for  instance,  it  may  be  useful  to  inquire  into  the  formal
structure of moral justification or to discuss what counts as morally significant. This
because there is no agreement among discussants on these points. As is evident, formal
analyses  of  this  kind do not  have immediate  practical  bearings.  So,  if  the  ultimate
criterion  of  validity  of  moral  reasoning  is  its  effectiveness  in  transforming  and
meliorating existing normative practices, it would be difficult to accept them as correct
forms of moral inquiry even though it would be equally difficult to question that they
are legitimate moves in the “game of morality.” As the increasing complexity of human
social systems has brought about new needs and demands, it has brought about also a
plurality  of  autonomous  contexts  of  inquiry.  This  plurality  is  a  fact  of  scientific
experience, and has therefore to be acknowledged in its own right. But if this is true,
then the emphasis on the primacy of practice over theory risks to be a too restrictive
criterion.
28 I do not want to say that Frega’s pragmatism of normative practices programmatically
rules out the possibility of recognizing a certain degree of autonomy to the various
levels of reflection. Rather the contrary, I  do believe that this insight can be easily
accommodated within the framework of  his  constructivism. It  is  even possible  that
Frega would consider the problems of defining the nature of moral justification and of
clarifying  what  is  morally  significant  as  scientific  (theoretical)  rather  than  moral
issues.  Nonetheless,  I  think that his insistence on practice,  his  criticism of external
justification,  his  suspiciousness  of  what  he  calls  “an  understanding  of  human
experience […] dominated by a hyper-rational conception of human reason” may lead
to a form of anti-intellectualism that sacrifices much that should be preserved (110-2).
And this is a risk that does not concern only Frega’s masterful investigations of moral
inquiry, but the entire pragmatist movement.
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